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S_NOLON

ARTICLE
The Lawyer as Process Advocate:
Encouraging Collaborative Approaches to
Controversial Development Decisions
SEAN F. NOLON *
INTRODUCTION
On most nights, in most communities, a public hearing on an
application for senior housing would bring out an angry mob of
neighbors. However, on this night, neighbor after neighbor
approaches the microphone to encourage the local government to
approve the application submitted by the developer.
The
developer’s lawyer turns to him and says, “What’s going on here?
I’ve never seen anything like this in my life.” What was different
about this proposal that changed the dynamic from hostile to
productive? Can it be repeated? Why did this come as such a
surprise to the attorney? Can this process be abused, allowing
parties to be taken advantage of? Answers to these questions and
others will be explored with the help of four case studies
highlighting the use of collaboration to manage development
conflicts requiring land use approvals from the local government.
Based on lessons from these examples, the author presents a
framework to help lawyers who want to play a larger role in
promoting and facilitating similar collaborations.
Much like Eris’s golden apple of discord, 1 a significant
development proposal can incite hostility in an otherwise peaceful
community dashing any hope for achieving greater community
benefit. Significant development proposals can be seen as
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Dispute Resolution
Program, Vermont Law School. The author would like to thank to Margaret
Byerly, Brian Jones and Crystal Heide for research assistance, Richard Brooks
and Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold for comments on earlier versions and,
especially, Theodore Kheel for his leadership in the area of environmental
awareness and dispute resolution.
1. THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 211 (Crown Publishers 1979)
(1913).
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unwanted threats causing irreversible change or great
opportunities to provide critical resources to ailing communities. 2
Typically, these development decisions involve significant
controversy and produce unsatisfying results. They can result in
destroyed environmental resources, wasted money, divided
community and loss of opportunities for mutual gain. Why do
these
proposals
become
such
battlegrounds—polarizing
neighbors, frustrating developers, paralyzing local officials, and
producing unsatisfying results?
Specifically, this article deals with situations where
development is likely to occur, the development will have a large
impact on the community, the governmental decision makers
have discretion over what can be approved, and opposition is
likely. Typically, in these types of situations community benefit
is not maximized because the decision is limited to compromises
that only satisfy the lowest common denominator and do little to
create value. Conventional wisdom holds that little can be done
to make the governmental decision-making process more
productive.
However, the practice and theory of dispute
resolution, collaboration and conflict management suggests
otherwise. 3
The effects of process are often not given appropriate
consideration when planning for a significant land use
development. The applicant often views the facts and the law
that supports his position as the most important factor in
determining the outcome of a decision; leaving process as
secondary. For example, proponents will point to studies that
show positive tax benefits of a project as justification for approval
while opponents present evidence that the infrastructure cannot

2. Elsa Brenner, Yonkers Mayor Wants Action on Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2008.
3. See, e.g., Edith Netter, Using Mediation to Resolve Land Use Disputes, in
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 179 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1992);
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES: THE
NEW WAY TO RUN MEETINGS, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS (2006);
BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY
PROBLEMS (1989); JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING
COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (2000).
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support the proposal as justification for denial. 4 The parties
engage in an adversarial process and expect that verifiable data,
applicable law, and the force of their convictions will produce the
desired result. 5 While facts are indeed important, the process
used to present and deliberate the facts is also important. A good
process can improve the substantive options by uncovering new
information and discovering new connections. For example, even
if a development could benefit all parties involved, a process that
stokes hostility and promotes mistrust will eliminate any
opportunities to capture that benefit. The process by which the
developer crafts the proposal and the community engages in
response will either create or eliminate options for satisfactory
outcomes. Many parties fail to recognize that they have the
ability to choose a process and that choice of process will
determine the outcome as much as, if not more than, the
substantive characteristics of the proposal.
Process plays a central role in influencing what substantive
possibilities the parties will consider.
Highly competitive
processes only consider a narrow set of outcomes. In more
cooperative processes, where parties are able to explore
alternatives, a broader range of outcomes can be considered.
Since controversial development decisions, like the ones in Part
II, resist narrow solutions, limiting oneself to a strict competitive
approach is inappropriate. Satisfying the range of issues in these
complicated matters requires broad thinking and, therefore, the
integration of collaborative approaches. The use of concept
committees in the four case studies offers one example of how to
integrate these approaches.
To help parties take advantage of these opportunities
lawyers must play a more central and active role in advocating
for good process. Lawyers are embedded in all aspects of local
decisions—they formally represent applicants, opponents, and
decision makers, they informally advise through casual
conversations and opinion, they are members of the community,
maybe the applicant themselves, and frequently are members of
4. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND
POLICIES (1966); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE
IMPASSE (1987).
5. Barbara McAdoo & Larry Bakken, Local Government Use of Mediation
for Resolution of Public Disputes, 22 URB. LAW. 179, 183 (1990).

3

S_NOLON

106

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

the local government. When process decisions are being made by
the applicant, opponents or the local government lawyers are
actively involved. Too often, however, these lawyers miss the
opportunity to counsel clients on appropriate process. Lawyers
mistakenly limit their participation to counseling on substantive
legal advice or procedural advice limited to what the law requires
instead of what it allows.
This article is organized to help lawyers provide procedural
advice so that their clients can participate effectively and
efficiently in a collaborative process without compromising legal
entitlements. Using the four cases and exploring relevant
scholarship, the author provides an accessible framework for
attorneys who are involved in conflicts over land development.
Part I examines why the required process is adversarial and what
consequences that has for significant development decisions.
Part II presents the four case studies that illustrate how
collaborative approaches were used effectively in several
significant development decisions. Each example describes how a
group of interested citizens participated as part of a concept
committee to provide pre-application input into a development
proposal. Part III provides a framework of six lessons to help
lawyers be more effective process advocates.
I.

LIMITATIONS OF THE REQUIRED PROCESS

A.

Local Government and Land Use

In the United States, the primary authority to approve the
development of land has been delegated to local governments. 6
This includes towns, townships, villages and cities at the sub6. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 47 (2d ed. 2007) (pointing out
that this is not a blanket delegation and there is a tremendous range of
delegations among the fifty states); Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the
Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
441 (2007) (noting that the land use regulatory system is located primarily at
the local level of governance in the United States, despite the rise of federal and
state statutes and regulations that govern certain aspects of land use); Erin
Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in
Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 341 (2002) (discussing
how local governments vigorously wield the police power to protect various
public interests in land use).
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county level. According to the Census Bureau there are over
35,000 local governments. 7 When making land use decisions,
local governments must do so pursuant to specific authorizations
State enabling laws create the
and detailed procedures. 8
structure for this system that allows local governments to control
the development of land. 9 While each state has a different
system, the overall structure has many similarities. 10 This
section looks at how decisions are made in this system, why
certain procedures are followed, when procedures work well, and
why they fail when trying to address significant development
proposals like those in Part II.
The land use system has both substantive and procedural
requirements.
Substantive
requirements
specify
where
7. U.S. Census Bureau, The U.S. Census of Governments, available at
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/cog/2007/techdocgovorg.pdf.
8. BARLOW BURKE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS 6 (2d ed. 2009).
[A]ny activity the municipal government undertakes: (1) must be
expressly authorized by the state legislature—it must be authorized in
express words in a state statute, or (2) it must be reasonably necessary to
the achievement of an activity that is expressly authorized—it must be
incidental to an express authorization; or (3) it must be essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the municipality.
Id.

9. Id. at 8 (noting “[t]here is no inherent municipal power to zone. Neither
does such a power spring from the creation of a municipal corporation or local
government. Absent home rule powers, some specific state enabling act or
statutory authority is required. Such authority in fact exists today in every
state.”); see also John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use
System: A Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control,
in LAND USE LAW FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 581 (noting that “states
retain[ ] the power to define and limit property rights . . . From that reservoir of
authority, states have delegated land use control principally to local
governments.”).
10. BABCOCK, supra note 4, at 157.
It is reasonable to expect, from municipality to municipality, differences
in substantive goals and objectives, and it is not essential to procedural
due process that there be uniformity in procedure among the hundreds of
municipalities in each state. But substantial uniformity of local
procedure will be an inevitable consequence of an insistence by the state
that each community that elects to regulate land use maintain a
procedural system that contributes to fairness and openness in local
administration.
Id.
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development can occur and how it can be built. Specifying a
development envelope, allowing density bonuses, and defining to
what extent scenic resources can limit development potential are
all examples of substantive requirements; federal, state and local
provisions all serve as sources for this authority. For example, a
local law or decision must not violate the “takings” clause of the
federal constitution by taking land without just compensation. 11
Federal telecommunications law prohibits local boards from
regulating cell towers based on health effects. 12 State enabling
laws prescribe what local governments can regulate and what
they cannot. 13 With this authority, local governments can enact
laws to create zones that segregate uses into districts and
describe how development will take place on the land. 14 From
these substantive requirements landowners have a general idea
of what is allowed on their land and how it can be built.
B. THE REQUIRED PROCESS
Procedural requirements dictate what process a local
government must follow in order to take substantive action. 15
These procedural requirements apply to such legislative actions
as adopting a zoning ordinance and to administrative action such
as a subdivision application, as well as judicial actions like
variances and interpretations. 16 Examples include: time frames
for providing notice of the proposal; who should be notified;
duration of public hearings; filing requirements at the local,
regional and state level; time frames for decision making; record
11. The 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits deprivation
of property without due process of law is made applicable to the states and local
governments through the 14th Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; see also ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD M.
FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1999).
12. See Laurie Dichiara, Wireless Communication Facilities: Siting For Sore
Eyes, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (1998).
13. BURKE, supra note 8, at 161 (observing that “[i]n enacting any
amendment, municipal legislatures must follow the procedures set out in their
own enabling statutes.”).
14. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
15. BURKE, supra note 8, at 161 (citing Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 538 A.2d
808, 812-13 (N.J. 1988)); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 2.41
to .43, § 6.67 (5th ed. 2003).
16. MANDELKER, supra note 15, §§ 6.67 to .76.
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keeping; time frames for appealing a decision; the standard of
review on appeal; what constitutes a conflict of interest; as well
as technical specifications for the underlying application. 17 If a
decision fails to follow one of these requirements and is appealed,
it can be overturned on procedural grounds even if it is, in
substance, the correct decision. 18
Again, local governments must look to federal, state and local
law to make sure they follow the proper decision-making
structure. For example, local administrative decisions must
provide for due process protections. 19 State law requires a local
government to hold a public hearing within a required number of
days after accepting an application 20 and must document its
action in accordance with sunshine laws. 21 A local government
can enact rules to define when an application is deemed
complete. 22
The required process at the local level is a mosaic of
requirements from federal and state constitutions, statutes and
regulations, local and regional laws, as well as locally adopted
board procedures. 23 Unlike federal agencies, which must comply
with the Administrative Procedures Act, 24 each local government
has a different set of procedures. The process varies from state to
state, county to county and municipality to municipality. 25 With

17. Id. § 6.70.
18. In re City of Schenectady v. Flacke, 475 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984); In re Envtl. Defense Fund v. Flacke, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983) (holding “[w]e must determine whether the entities involved have
complied with the procedural requirements. . .” (citing In re Cohalan v. Carey,
452 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
19. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 1.01.
20. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(5)(d) (McKinney 2009).
21. See, e.g., The Freedom of Information Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF .Law §§ 84-90
(McKinney 2009); The Open Meetings Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF . Law §§ 100-111
(McKinney 2009).
22. KAREN SCHNELLER-MACDONALD ET AL., TOWN OF MILAN PLANNING BD.,
HABITAT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES (2005), available at http://www.ecosny.org/conf
erences/Sustaining%20conf%20Feb%202%202007%20presentations/milanhabita
tassessmentguidelinesfinal-12-06-05.pdf.
23. Arnold, supra note 6, at 449, 487, 490-91.
24. Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554 (2006) (creating a
framework for decision making and review of agency actions).
25. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 1.16.
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over 35,000 local government entities in the United States 26 the
variety is impressive. For the purposes of this article, however,
there are sufficient similarities among all these local
governments to draw parallels and construct a working model.
While the required process is different in each jurisdiction, it
generally follows four basic stages: (1) an application is accepted
by the board; (2) the board deliberates; (3) the board solicits
public comment; and (4) the board makes a decision. 27 Beyond
these four stages, the process in each community varies
depending on the type of action28 and the jurisdiction. 29
Governmental decision-makers are typically aware of the local
requirements but frequently rely on advice from attorneys and
clerks on how procedure applies in specific situations. In most
situations, when asked about appropriate process, the advising
attorneys explain what procedures must be followed. Lawyers
rarely provide information about what other processes can be
used and the advantages and disadvantages of other processes.
Few lawyers are aware that the required process can be
supplemented and that it may be beneficial to do so.
Being a subdivision of state governments in a federal system,
the required process at the local level is informed by the
governmental structures at the other levels. The three functions
of government—executive (administrative), legislative and
judicial—present at the federal and state level are also found at
the local level. 30 While these functions are neatly housed in
branches of federal and state governments, the structure at the
local level is not so tidy. For example, the local chief elected
official (mayor, first selectman, supervisor, etc.) may perform
some executive functions and may perform some legislative

26. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 7. The U.S. Census of 2007 counts
36,011 sub-county general-purpose governmental entities. If we include
counties, which often have some form of land use control, the number is
obviously higher.
27. This structure loosely follows trial like proceedings. See BURKE, supra
note 8, at 157; cf. BABCOCK, supra note 4, at 154 (finding that “local
administrative practices vary from some resemblance to rules for judicial
hearings to the most colloquial proceedings”).
28. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 6.70.
29. Id. § 1.16.
30. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, § 5.9.
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functions. 31 She may sit as a member of the local legislature and
vote on legislation 32 and she may or may not have veto
authority. 33 Similarly, the legislative body, in addition to having
legislative responsibilities, may have executive powers to appoint
and oversee the staff that administers the local laws. 34 While
some communities have judicial boards to interpret zoning laws
and hear variances, 35 others rely on the state judicial system to
perform this function. 36 Despite this dizzying variety, for the
purposes of this article, it is important to remember that at the
local level, executive, legislative, and judicial functions exist, but
are carried out by different entities depending on the type of
proposal. 37
Significant development proposals may require approvals
that engage all three of these governmental functions from
inception to implementation. A developer may request a change
to the law that would require a legislative action such as a
rezoning or an amendment to the comprehensive plan. If
granted, the developer will then need to go through an
administrative process to get approval for the proposal before
31. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 223 (2d ed. 2001).
The tripartite division of the federal and state governments into
independent branches is not reflected in the set-up of a great many cities.
The mayor of a city is, for instance, generally not an exclusively executive
officer and does not enjoy immunity from the subpoena powers of the
legislative branch. There is much overlapping of administrative,
legislative, and even judicial functions among municipal organs—and
ideally, much cooperation.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 58 (stating that in a weak-mayor format, the mayor has little, if
any veto power, while in a strong-mayor format, the mayor has veto power over
most legislation).
34. See id.
35. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, § 5.32.
36. Id.
37. In some communities, a planning board serves as the principal
administrative board, hearing most subdivision and site plan applications.
There may, however, be certain decisions over which the local legislature retains
administrative authority to grant site plans and subdivision in areas of critical
importance. See, e.g., Jayne E. Daly, What's Really Needed to Effectuate
Resource Protection in Communities, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 193 (2002)
(explaining how the Town of Dover in New York reserved site plan approval for
all parcels in the “Mixed Use Institutional Conversion Overlay” zone).
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beginning to develop. After the administrative approval, the
project may need a variance from the quasi-judicial entity. After
all these approvals, construction can begin and will likely be
monitored by an enforcement officer to ensure compliance with
permit conditions.
Depending on the proposal and the
community, these separate functions may or may not be
performed by the same entity.
Regardless of the function the government is performing, the
required process organizes interactions and communications to be
directed at the governmental body. This separates the applicant
from the community and discourages communication across the
divide. In the required process, the landowner submits the
application and the community can only participate at designated
opportunities.
Participation required by law is limited to
providing comments, in person or in writing, in response to the
submitted application at a public hearing. Once sufficient
information is collected, the government then rules based on
evidence and relevant law. 38 Because this process is deliberately
designed to be like a trial, the parties see each other as
adversaries competing in front of the governmental body. In
routine land development matters, this adversarial dynamic does
not interfere with good decision-making; in significant land
development matters, it presents a considerable obstacle.
C.

When the Required Process Works Well

For routine decisions—where the government has limited
discretion, understands how to apply the governing regulations,
implicates few parties, and presents a limited number of issues to
be resolved—the required process works well.
In these
situations, a landowner submits the application, it is reviewed,
there is an opportunity to be heard, and the government makes a
decision in a timely manner. When a party’s interests are
consistent with the rights codified in the existing law the
required process will likely produce a satisfying outcome. In
these situations, the required process is efficient, effective, and
predictable. A majority of the development decisions fall into this

38. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 6.70.
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category. 39 As a result, most of a government’s decisions are
handled in a timely manner through the required process.
D. Limitations of the Required Process
The required process, while efficient, is also adversarial. The
government is the ultimate decision-maker and the parties
participate in a trial-like environment to present their
arguments. Parties may work out a compromise, but it is likely
to be limited in scope and must be approved by the government.
What typically happens is that parties become consumed with
winning the battle instead of working constructively to identify
an appropriate solution. 40 Their interactions can become fueled
by misinformation and fear, causing them to spend significant
resources attempting to advance their position by spinning facts,
undermining the other parties, and fighting over procedure. For
the applicant, the process can force her to engage in competitive
behaviors that encourage deception, manipulation, and, in some
cases, corruption. 41 For neighbors, they may work to prevent
inquiry into appropriate solutions, while attacking the applicant
and intimidating the government with threats of political
retribution. 42 For the government, it becomes more about
surviving and making a defensible decision than achieving a
pareto-optimal solution. 43
Unfortunately, parties typically assume that required
processes cannot be supplemented because they equate “required”
with “exclusive.” While the required process does specify what a
board must do in order to make a decision, the required process
imposes a minimum, not a maximum. The government must hold
a public hearing, the applicant must notify adjacent property
owners, and the government must make a decision within a given
39. Phil Kenkel, Cooperative Management Series: Effective Decision
Making in the Board Room, OKLA. COOP . EXTENSION SERV. (n.d.),
http://pods.dasnr.okstate.edu/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-1784/AGEC979
web.pdf
40. SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CITIZENS’ GROUPS 16 (2d ed.
2001).
41. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE, supra note 4, at 3-13.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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time frame. These mandates do not bar the government from
suggesting or requiring additional procedures in appropriate
Some governments have enacted precircumstances. 44
application procedures, 45 others have extended the notice
provisions to include more than the minimum number of
participants, 46 while still others have held extensive
informational sessions that go far beyond what is required at a
Governments have ample authority to
public hearing. 47
supplement the required process when an adversarial process will
limit the creativity needed to advance and protect their
constituents’ needs. 48 If lawyers are aware that the required
process is a floor and not a ceiling, that the required process is
adversarial, and that adversarial processes stifle creativity, they
will be more likely to suggest and participate in supplemental
procedures.
II. SUPPLEMENTING THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS
TO FOSTER COLLABORATION
The following development case studies illustrate how parties
can take advantage of opportunities presented by collaborative
approaches. 49 Using these examples, we can see how the
44. In re Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1997) (sanctioning
informal, voluntary, multi-party negotiations during local environmental review
process); State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. COMP . CODES . R. &
REGS . tit. 6, §§ 617.3, 617.2(b)(1) (2009) (waiving applicable time periods for
environmental reviews); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(8) (McKinney 2009) (allowing
subdivision time frames to be extended by mutual consent of owner and
planning board).
45. See SCHNELLER-MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 22.
46. Town of Gardiner, N.Y., TOWN CODE ch. 160 (2005) (extending the area of
notification regarding applications and public hearings).
47. Consensus Building Institute, Streamlining Community Planning in
Falmouth, Maine, http://cbuilding.org/publication/case/streamlining-communityplanning-falmouth-maine (last visited Dec. 15, 2009) (describing how this
community used a volunteer stakeholder advisory committee to improve the
land use system).
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49. A subcommittee of The Westchester County Executive’s Task Force on
Environment and Development that has first-hand experience with this new
approach worked with Pace University’s Land Use Law Center to document
these cases. SEAN F. NOLON & EMILY M. BECK, COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENTS: A
REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT APPROVALS ACHIEVED THROUGH COLLABORATION (Sept.
10, 2003) (on file with author).
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required approval processes can be supplemented to be creative
and less adversarial while still protecting clients’ interests.
These cases involved significant development decisions and used
a range of collaborative processes to produce proposals that
united and satisfied more than they divided and infuriated. In all
of these cases, an application to develop a specific parcel had been
submitted or was likely to be submitted to the local government,
key parties decided that using predominately collaborative
techniques presented significant advantages over predominantly
adversarial techniques, and use of those techniques resulted in an
approval that enjoyed widespread support. The process was still
difficult, challenging and, at times, frustrating, but the overall
experience was productive and the outcomes more satisfying than
not.
Each case is organized to provide a description of the
proposal, details about the subject parcel, the process used, and
summaries of the parties’ experience. In some of these examples,
applicants and government officials, involved residents early in
the process, sometimes even before triggering the required
process. Information for the case studies was obtained from
interviews of the participants, during which they were
encouraged to offer their critical assessment. Segments of these
interviews are included to provide their perspective. Accordingly,
no project is portrayed as perfect.
Despite some critical
comments, the developers, local officials, and residents listed
many incentives to employing collaborative processes.
A.

From Senior Housing to Clustered Single Family

The developer acquired a seven-acre parcel with an eightysix-bed nursing home that had recently been closed. Their
original plan was to turn it into affordable apartment housing for
senior citizens. Based on meetings with officials and neighbors,
the developer felt there was sufficient support to proceed with
applications for zoning approval and to the state for affordablehousing tax credits. The developers learned that the zoning code
would also permit a subdivision into approximately twenty lots
for single-family residences, but considered the senior housing
plan more suited for the property. Notwithstanding developer’s
preference, however, the property was developed as clustered
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single-family homes—the result of conversation with neighbors
who stood to be most affected by the project.
The developer created a process to engage the twenty-four
adjacent neighbors and provide them with a choice of what could
be built. Another fifteen were included after they registered a
complaint that they had been left out. Over the course of two to
three months, approximately six meetings were held. There were
no ground rules or formal agendas; and the developer decided
who would participate in the meetings, as well as their timing
and content. Officials were in favor of the process, and indicated
that the municipality would support the residents’ decision.
Residents were also encouraged to visit recent projects of the
developer in nearby communities. At the final meeting, the
residents were presented with alternative site plans for senior
housing, a clustered development of eighteen single-family homes
with a conservation easement on the perimeter, and a
conventional twenty-two, lot subdivision.
The developer
indicated his preference for senior housing, but made it clear that
the decision was the residents’ as long as they would continue to
support the project throughout the planning process. After
questions, a vote was taken where all but one family chose the
clustered single-family housing development.
A leading official was himself in favor of affordable housing
for senior citizens, pointing out the advantages over single family
homes: a larger tax base, preservation of more open space, no
burden on the schools, a minimal increase in traffic, and less need
for emergency services. In his view, the final plan benefits a
handful of homeowners to the detriment of the community. But
while he wishes the developer had made more of an effort to sway
residents in favor of affordable housing, the official is enthusiastic
about what he described as an “excellent, democratic” process.
The developer felt that if they had insisted on proceeding
with senior housing on the site, the project would not have been
built. They also note that they were not required to prepare an
environmental impact statement for single family homes and
accordingly saved a great deal of time and money. Asked
whether a mediator would have improved the process, they said
“no”—that in fact a mediator might have created a barrier
between them and the residents, who were “open and delighted to
be asked to participate” in the decision-making process. The
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developer noted that the success of the consensual approach
depends on the menu of choices that can be offered the
community and what is feasible for the developer.
A homeowner who attended many of the meetings said that
although several residents initially reacted to the developer with
suspicion, he won over many with his candor—admitting, for
example, that he would need to construct at least seventeen
homes in order to recoup his investment. This person did not
believe a mediator would have appreciably improved the process;
she felt that the developer handled the residents well and was
effective in getting those who supported the project to help win
zoning approval through their participation in official meetings.
One couple that was interviewed was among the two or three
households that preferred housing for senior citizens on the site.
They said that many other residents also supported this plan at
first, but changed their minds in favor of single-family homes
when a well-respected fellow neighbor pointed out that property
values would increase if single-family residences were built on
the property. Notwithstanding the couple’s disagreement with
the final result, they praised the developer for his flexible
attitude. In fact, they add, meetings became social gatherings
that neighbors looked forward to, and everyone was able to know
each other a little better.
The neighbor who steered people toward the plan for singlefamily homes lives nearby the site of the old nursing home. Her
memory is that only two people initially supported affordable
senior housing; most were opposed to the concept of a large
apartment building and some, apparently, to the “affordable”
aspect. Once they learned of the option of clustering homes on a
portion of the property and creating the “magnificent buffer zone”
around them, the neighbors were firmly behind the single
residences plan. This person is enthusiastic about her experience
with the consensus building process, and considers the developer
to have done an excellent job of communicating with the residents
and of preserving the land.
B.

Rezoning from Single Family to Townhouses

The 254-acre parcel was zoned for single-family subdivision
but the developer was not sure it was the best use for the
property. The developer asked the municipality to establish a
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concept committee to explore alternative plans for the property.
As a result of the process, the zoning was changed to allow a golf
course, eighty-five townhomes, two single-family homes and
sixty-three acres of open space. According to the Consensus
Memorandum issued by the concept committee, the golf course
was to be “environmentally friendly”. The committee’s support of
the project was expressly premised on the development of
safeguards against compromising quality of the downstream
reservoirs and ongoing monitoring and testing.
The developer and the municipality selected the participants
for the committee after soliciting volunteers. As established, the
committee consisted of several local officials and neighbors,
including a member of a local group that promotes environmental
awareness and smart growth. While the committee had the
municipality’s endorsement, meetings were not mandatory, nor
were they to be considered in any way a substitute for the official
decision-making process. At one meeting, the golf partner of the
developer answered questions from the committee, including
queries as to impacts on water, traffic, open space access, and
preservation of wildlife corridors. The developer brought in a
professional mediator for another session. The committee met six
times over the course of seven weeks. The developer wrote
summaries of each meeting and circulated them to the committee
members with the agenda for the next meeting. His firm paid for
the site and building plans presented to the committee. There
was no opposition to the meetings and no one dropped out.
Certain representatives from the town who attended the
concept committee meetings indicated that they had some
misgivings about the process. One official remarked that by
drafting minutes of the meetings, the developer retained control
of the process and did not go far enough to get the committee’s
approval of the minutes. Another commented that the developer
inflated the number of homes that were likely to be approved and
felt that he manipulated the committee into agreeing to a larger
development than it otherwise would have chosen. One member
felt that the committee participants should have been examined
for conflicts of interest before being asked to join. A town official
who participated throughout the approval process and who favors
collaborative approaches says the developer lost much hard won
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credibility by waiting until the eleventh hour to disclose his
decision to switch the golf course from public to private.
Each of the neighbors would have preferred to see a smaller
development on the parcel; one stated that there was “no solid
feeling” that the end result was acceptable to all. And while no
one felt that the project or the committee process itself was forced
upon them, they all believe that a neutral facilitator would have
made for a fairer, more satisfactory process. Notwithstanding
their criticism, all considered the use of a concept committee
beneficial, and all appreciated the opportunity to choose among
alternative projects for the site.
The developer said he formed a concept committee because
he wanted consensus from the outset, which he believed would
result in a better project. Both he and his associate expressed
enthusiasm for the project, asserting that it was “wonderfully
well planned, addressed owners’ and environmentalists’ needs,
and pretty much everyone was happy.” The alternative, in their
view, was a contentious approval process that would have taken
years to complete with no guarantee of approval. The developer
sees involving the community as the way to address residents’
fears fueled by incorrect and misleading information and notes
that a concept committee provides an additional forum to the
required process for residents to speak about their concerns. The
concept committee’s involvement and approval made the required
process run more smoothly.
Despite the developer’s use of the concept committee for this
project, he drew the community’s ire by switching from a public
course to a private course after the committee had reached
agreement. The issue of residents’ use of the course was later
resolved by allowing residents twenty-five rounds of golf six days
per week and by providing access for two school golf teams. The
developer learned an important lesson: the committee’s work
continues after an agreement is reached. Openness must be
maintained throughout the process—no matter how complicated
or uncertain the issues are. The developer sees no disadvantage
to seeking community participation, but cautions that the process
will work only if committee members participate voluntarily. At
the least, he says, using a collaborative approach will make for a
shorter, more reasonable approval process.
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A local conservation group had some concerns about the
process and the result. According to one interviewee, the
environment is the one element often entirely left out of the
process in land development. This project was a prime example
of a case in which the scientific perspective was neglected. For
example, no representative of this group was included in the
concept committee; issues of biodiversity or wildlife were only
brought out in the required process—at a point too far along to
examine and resolve them properly. And since the developer had
already been involved with the concept committee, he was not
open to considering important additional modifications after
information was revealed in the required process.
While
acknowledging the attraction of resolving land use problems in a
non-adversarial manner, this person believes the fundamental
problem with collaboration is that environmental considerations
are brought up too late in the process for them to receive
adequate attention. Accordingly, the interviewee warns against
using these committees as a cure-all to land development
controversies.
An official who was also involved in conservation and who
was invited to view the site credits the developer with having an
open mind. According to the interviewee, he did make some
modifications to the golf course in order to avoid sensitive
resources, but remains extremely concerned with the adequacy of
a fifty-foot buffer on a critical watercourse and the number of
exceptions within the buffer. According to the interviewee, the
developer demonstrated a “real unwillingness” to consider design
changes. The interviewee was uncomfortable with the fact that
the developer had the power to revert to his alternative proposal
for ninety or more single-family homes, which had also undergone
an environmental review. Maintaining the concept committee
through the required process, this person believes, may well have
ensured a more thorough and satisfactory resolution of the water
quality issues.
One resident who lives near the site found the concept
committee helpful in giving the townspeople an opportunity to
evaluate the alternative development proposals and focus on the
one or two that were most appropriate. Finding out what people
object to and are concerned about at the outset rather than in
public meetings, this person feels, is the main advantage to such
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committees.
This individual found the developer fair and
balanced and did not feel that a facilitator would necessarily have
improved the process. Another resident on the concept committee
would have preferred preservation to the development of the site
and remains concerned about water quality. Nevertheless, this
person valued the use of a collaborative approach, noting that it
allowed residents to know what was being planned, made them
feel they were heard, and calmed some of their fears. A neighbor
agrees, and adds the opinion that the approving board should
promote the intelligent use of concept committees; since that body
is most often the starting point for a proposed project, it is in the
best position to recommend their use.
C.

Rezoning for Senior Housing

This project demonstrates how a collaborative approach used
in tandem with the required process can result in a proposal
welcomed by a large segment of the community. Before this
developer became involved, the fifty-one acre parcel was zoned for
commercial use. The developer initiated a process to rezone the
parcel to allow for senior housing clustered on part of the
property with significant open space.
Faced with the hurdle of rezoning, the developer organized a
consensus committee to identify interests and build support.
Local officials were informed of the meetings and endorsed the
process. There were at least ten informal meetings of thirty-forty
residents usually with the same nucleus of five to seven of the
most interested citizens. The developer served as the process
manager by preparing the agenda and organizing presentations
by architects, engineers, and other experts. By the time approval
was obtained, over one hundred meetings had been held.
One official who attended dozens of meetings believed the
collaborative effort worked so well because both the municipality
and the developer were highly motivated. The town gained
desired housing with minimal disruption and received additional
benefits of green space for the public, and also received much
needed sewer connections. In the end, the property was rezoned
with little opposition. By going to the community, the developer
ended up with strong support during the required process and no
unpleasant surprises. He does not believe a facilitator would
have improved the process based on his experience that a
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purported neutral usually has a relationship with someone. At
least with the developer as process manager, he notes, the
residents are aware of the bias. His suggestions for others
undertaking is a collaborative approach: talk to the residents
early on and take them seriously, “you may discover the project
isn’t palatable or needs to be curtailed.”
A longtime resident whose home will become part of the new
sewer district took an active role in meetings with the developer.
The vast majority of residents supported the project, this person
says, because it meant a residential development without
burdening the school system. The open and recreational space
was an additional benefit; the interviewee believes the forty acres
were offered to the community by the developer because they
consist largely of undevelopable wetlands and steep slopes.
Support was not unanimous, the interviewee admits. At least one
homeowner objected to the building height, and there have been
accusations that those benefiting from the sewer deal are “selling
out.” Another opponent doesn’t like what the developer is
building in another community and so will object to any project
proposed by the developer. One resident feels that the developer
has been consistent throughout the process and willing to work
with the community. “People always think developers lie and
cheat, but they’re just businessmen, trying to make money.”
D. Senior Condominiums
This project represents a successful mix of affordable housing
for seniors that meets a current need, inter-municipal cooperation, and creative land preservation. The developer originally
proposed to build 112 senior apartments and forty attached
single-family houses. The number of units was decreased and the
overall plan revised after a series of meetings with local
residents. The revised plan has more contiguous open space that
is protected by a conservation easement and served by a trail
system, public access to a pond area, and ten percent of the
affordable senior housing to local residents.
The developer began the project by holding several meetings
with local officials. Encouraged that he would be able to forge a
consensus in support of his proposal, the developer acquired the
site and then initiated several rounds of meetings with neighbors,
both in groups and one-on-one. Meetings were informal and
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without ground rules, but provided an open forum for people to
voice their opinions and concerns. Residents’ reactions ultimately
led to revision of the site plan to reduce building height and
length for the senior facility by adding a third structure, moving
single family homes away from neighboring properties, and
creating more contiguous open space. Parking was relocated to
adjacent property through negotiations with the property’s
owner, unnecessary emergency access eliminated, and a
conservation easement placed on a portion of the site.
One official who attended all of the meetings as an observer
notes the favorable impression the developer made with many of
the participants. The meetings were well attended and were
conducted where anyone who wished to speak could. The
principal issues brought up concerned the size of buffers and the
emergency access road. This individual says that the developer
was able to mitigate nearly every problem. The interviewee
considers him a “good businessman [who] took people’s concerns
seriously” and believes his approach saved a good deal of time
and money, noting that he had a much easier time in obtaining
the board’s approval because he worked with the members
throughout the process. He would like to see the collaborative
techniques used more often. For another official of the town,
however, this project does not provide a particularly good
example of consensus building. One official is not aware that the
municipality was brought into the process at all. He feels that
they had no say in where the entrance to the development would
be located and no real options in the matter.
A local environmental group was concerned about potential
problems with storm water runoff, impacts on wetlands and
wetland buffers, and compromising a portion of a reservoir. Some
residents had come to the group with similar concerns. The
environmental group found it easy to work with the developer.
The developer repositioned homes to avoid encroaching on
wetland buffers, reduced the length of driveways to decrease the
amount of impervious surfaces, used porous pavement for
driveways near buffers, added a water quality treatment basin,
and made it pedestrian friendly. Remarking on the development
process generally, she said there needs to be a “wholesale change
in the way planning is done.”
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Another resident involved in conservation is a self-described
“strict environmentalist” who expressed opposition to the project
and who, early on in the process, made a sarcastic comment to
the developer about the destruction of trees. His participation in
the process was mainly through one-on-one meetings with the
developer. At their initial meeting, the developer made promises
concerning open space and water supply issues. The resident
admits to some skepticism but the developer kept his promises:
“He reached out to [me] as if [I were] a stakeholder even when I
had no control over the situation.” The developer brought in
hydrologists to allay his fears over the aquifer and water shortage
problems, limited the number of trees cut, and created a walking
trail. Overall, this individual says, the process was “wonderful;””
he also felt that the “give and take” was possible because the
developer was so willing to listen and try to remedy certain
concerns. This resident does not believe a facilitator was needed
in this case, but appreciates that one would be advantageous if
there are other people “as stubborn in their views” as this person
was about what should be done.
III. LAWYER AS ADVOCATE FOR COLLABORATIVE
PROCESSES
The concept committees used in the cases above show how
the required process can be supplemented with collaborative
techniques. While lawyers play a central role in the selection of
process, few are trained to design, manage and participate in
collaborative processes. If lawyers are not familiar with these
processes they will be hesitant to participate or recommend them.
For example, what would have resulted in the cases above had
attorneys counseled against participating in the concept
committees?
The following framework is designed to help
lawyers provide valuable advice on collaborative processes and
more broadly satisfy client needs.
Most lawyers advise their clients to follow the required
process and are skeptical, if not hostile, of processes that go
beyond what is legally required. When looking at how lawyers
are trained, on one level, this makes sense. Law schools teach
students to provide advice on what is legal. They are trained to
tell clients what they must do. The required process is law;
clients must follow the law. However, on another level, this
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hostility does not square with the oath lawyers take to faithfully
discharge their duties and adhere to rules of professional
conduct. 50 Collaborative processes, while not required, offer
lawyers a mechanism to meet client needs and achieve better
outcomes.
Lawyers may also hesitate to recommend collaborative
processes fearing a diminished role as a substantive legal advisor.
For many lawyers, this is an important point to make: advocating
a supplementary process does not relegate the attorney to the
sidelines. Parties need competent legal advice to understand the
range of outcomes and not exaggerate alternatives or omit
relevant information.
Before agreeing to collaborate, and
certainly before reaching an agreement, a party must know what
they are likely to get in the required process. For example, a
developer needs to be aware of what she is entitled to as-of-right
and what is discretionary. Neighbors need to know the same
thing. Government officials need to know what authority they
have to approve or deny a particular application and what
information is needed to support a decision.
An objective legal assessment is necessary to serve as a
comparison to what is being negotiated in the collaborative
process. This may be one of the harder things for attorneys to do
when faced with a significant development because rights are not
always clearly defined—especially in situations where the
government can make discretionary approvals and take
legislative actions.
However, when done thoroughly and
thoughtfully, a range of options comes into relief that can
sufficiently inform the evaluation of any agreement reached.
When done poorly, clients will have an inflated sense of
entitlement that serves as a barrier to reaching agreement. For
those attorneys seeking to expand their effectiveness as process
advocates, they need not give up their role as substantive
advocates. In fact, following the advice in the next section, can
improve their overall effectiveness.
The following subsections are organized to deal with issues
as they might arise in the course of representing a client in a
significant land development. First, a lawyer must know when
50. Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client of
ADR Options?, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 927
(Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow et al. eds., 2005).
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collaboration is appropriate and when the required process will
work to meet a client’s needs. Second, lawyers can help clients
see the positive aspects of conflict. Third, an awareness that
different processes produce different results helps parties to
recognize the consequences of process choices.
Fourth,
collaboration is not a nebulous term; it has discrete and definite
components. Fifth, any agreement reached must be presented to
the decision-making agency and is subject to the rigors of the
required process. Sixth, the subsequent required process must be
monitored to ensure the final decision adequately incorporates
the collaborative agreement.
A.

The Required Process Works Well, Most of the
Time

Supplementing the required process with collaborative
approaches—such as a concept committee—is not appropriate for
all development decisions. In fact, it is probably not appropriate
for the majority of development decisions. This is because the
required process works well most of the time. It handles most
land use decisions efficiently and effectively providing a
predictable set of procedures and legal rules for applicants to
follow when seeking governmental approval.
Specifically, the required process works well for development
decisions where the correct legal solution is obvious. These are
typically as-of-right decisions or ministerial decisions where the
government does not have much discretion, the issues are few
and uncomplicated, controversy is limited, the information
needed is obvious, and there is little debate about the validity of
the information. 51 Examples might include an application for a
single-family home, a minor addition and extension, a minor
subdivision and site plan, a sign, and a variance. In these
situations, following the required process will not limit the
outcomes available to the client because their needs can be met
through application of the law. If the government denies an
application, that decision can be appealed and, if found to be
incorrect, overturned. The need for a collaborative process in
these situations is minimized.
51. See McAdoo & Bakken, supra note 5, at 183.
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However, where the government has considerable decisionmaking discretion, a challenge or appeal is likely, and the
proposed development threatens considerable harm, the required
process does not work well. 52 Significant developments, like the
ones featured in Part II, have these characteristics. When clients
are faced with multi-party, multi-issue situations where parties
can benefit from sharing information, adhering to the required
process is not likely to generate satisfying outcomes. Helping
clients understand the effect of different processes is an
important role. 53
B.

Conflict Presents Opportunities

Many people take a negative view of conflict. 54 Many work
hard to avoid it and then, once embroiled, chart the quickest
course out of it. 55 Significant development conflicts are no
different. Neighbors, developers, and politicians will go to great
lengths to minimize conflicts and contain their effects. Once
embroiled in a controversy, parties rarely see past their
differences and their interactions take on a combative and
competitive tone. 56 They view each other as the archetypal foe:
developers as rapacious, greedy and deceitful, officials as
incompetent, corrupt and unresponsive and opponents as
parochial, hypocritical and untrustworthy. 57 The overwhelming
sense is that there is no common ground and the only option is to
prepare for battle and hope for a quick victory by defeating the
other side. 58
52. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 274 (2005);
John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land
Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
53. See Breger, supra note 50 (discussing how some states’ code of conduct
mandates that attorneys discuss the appropriate dispute resolution options with
a client).
54. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 19.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 17; MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE
AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 7 (1973).
57. See DOUGLAS PORTER, BREAKING THE DEVELOPMENT LOG JAM: NEW
STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING COMMUNITY SUPPORT (2006).
58. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 4-17.
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While pervasive, this negative perception presents an
incomplete vision of conflict. Mary Parker Follet, a labor
management expert from the 1920s, observed that, “all polishing
occurs through friction” 59 and according to Albert Einstein, “[i]n
the middle of difficulty lies opportunity.” 60 While the perception
of significant land developments is principally negative, these
decisions usually present many rich opportunities to mine mutual
gains. Finding a way to realize these benefits while still guarding
against the dangers is an exciting role for lawyers who recognize
the value of process advocacy.
In the Rezoning for Senior Housing case above, the property
was zoned for commercial use but the community needed senior
housing, open space, and sewer connections. 61 Many of the
houses around the parcel had failing septic systems that were
polluting the local drinking water supply. By adding the sewer
system, the developer saved the community money and time. In
return, the developer got a discretionary rezoning, predictability
in the decision-making process, and buy-in from the municipality
and the residents. If the developer had pursued an as-of-right
development under the commercial zoning, he would have had a
much harder time winning approval, if at all. 62 By exploiting
different priorities, the developer provided high value benefits to
the community at a low cost to him. For example, the developer
did not care about what would be built; but rather, what he
wanted was a return on his investment. Whether it was a mall or
senior housing did not matter to him; however, it mattered to the
community. On the other hand, the community wanted some
benefits out of the project but it did not care how long it took to
make a decision, but for the developer, time was money. A long
delay in the approval process due to citizen opposition and legal
appeals would be very costly. By searching for and finding these
trades the parties were able to manage the conflict to minimize
dangers and maximize opportunities.
59. MARY PARKER FOLLETT, DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS
MARY PARKER FOLLETT 31 (Henry C. Metcalf & L. Urwick eds., Harper &
Brothers Publishers 1940) (1926).
60. QuoteWorld.org, http://www.quoteworld.org/quotes/4122 (last visited Dec.
15, 2009).
61. See supra Part II.C.
62. NOLON & BECK, supra note 49.
OF
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For value to be created in land use conflicts, lawyers should
help parties identify opportunities while protecting them against
the dangers. Lawyers involved in significant developments have
the opportunity to shape their client’s view of the situation. If
they feed into a client’s negative view of conflict and promise a
quick resolution in an attempt to minimize danger, they will miss
opportunities to discover and explore differences that can lead to
creative outcomes. In Beyond Winning, the authors remind us
that “[d]ifferences are often more useful than similarities in
helping parties reach a deal [as] . . . [d]ifferences set the stage for
possible gains from a trade and it is through trades that value is
most commonly created.” 63
C.

Different Processes Produce Different Results

At stake in this choice of process is the type of outcomes that
are possible. The required process conducted as an adversarial
adjudication will produce narrow outcomes. 64 When parties
engage in adversarial processes, they become highly
competitive. 65 Their interactions become less about solving the
problem and more about undermining the other party. 66 This
shift away from problem solving is what reduces creativity.
There are many reasons why competitive, adversarial processes
discourage creativity. 67 The limited scope of the required process
inhibits the imagination of the parties. 68 The trial-like climate
forces attorneys and parties to think in oppositional and polarized

63. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 14 (2000).
64. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I. Wilson ed.,
rev. ed. 2001) (making the point that adjudicative decisions demand a level of
rationality that is not expected of negotiated agreements).
65. DOUGLAS YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 10 (1999).
66. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 17; see also DEUTSCH, supra
note 56, at 7.
67. See DEUTSCH, supra note 56; see also KENNETH E. BOULDING, CONFLICT
AND DEFENSE: A GENERAL THEORY (1962); LOUIS KRIESBERG, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SOCIAL CONFLICT (1973).
68. DEUTSCH, supra note 56, at 30 (noting that “[a] competitive process
stimulates the view that the solution of a conflict can only be one that is
imposed by one side on the other.”).
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frames instead of taking an expansive view of the situation. 69 It
leads parties to guard information and preferences closely for fear
of giving up some advantage. 70 It encourages the manipulation of
information to enhance one’s position and to erode or discredit the
other party’s. 71 Overall these tactics promote fear and mistrust
among the parties 72 that then drives parties to more competitive
interactions. 73 Once relations turn hostile, the likelihood of
seizing opportunities is greatly reduced and the range of possible
outcomes is further narrowed. 74
Lawyers play an important role in setting parties’
expectations about how to interact with each other in the
development approval process.
While it is impossible to
generalize about all lawyers, it is fair to say that the legal
profession encourages a competitive and oppositional approach to
conflict. 75 Lawyers typically assume that “(1) the disputants are
69. Id. at 29 (noting that “[a] competitive process tends to increase sensitivity
to differences and threats while minimizing the awareness of similarities. It
stimulates the sense of complete oppositeness.”); see also Robert M. Ackerman,
Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 30 (2002) (observing that “[r]egrettably, systems of
conflict resolution can also serve as barriers to community building. The
procedural nuances of litigation and arbitration can be manipulated to stifle
meaningful discourse among the disputants.”).
70. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1991) (1981);
ROGER AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
71. DEUTSCH, supra note 56, at 29.
A competitive process is characterized by either lack of communication or
misleading communication. It also gives rise to espionage or other
techniques of obtaining information about the other that the other is
unwilling to communicate. In addition to obtaining such information,
each part is interested in providing discouraging or misleading
information to the other.
Id.
72. Id. (indicating that “[i]t seems likely that competition produces a stronger
bias toward misperceiving the other’s neutrality or conciliatory actions as
malevolently motivated”).
73. Id. at 217; see also Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive
Bargaining, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 325 (1996).
74. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K, SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 34-35 (1986); see AXELROD,
supra note 70.
75. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV.
1337 (1997).
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adversaries—i.e., if one wins, the other must lose—and (2) that
disputes may be resolved through application, by a third party, of
some general rule of law.” 76 This adversarial approach may be
useful in situations where parties are negotiating to distribute a
fixed resource, there is overlap in the bargaining range, and
In these
where future relationships are not important. 77
situations, an adversarial approach efficiently distributes the
resource among the parties. 78
In significant developments, however, parties are not dealing
with a fixed resource that can only be divided up into finite
pieces. While the land being debated is a fixed resource, what
can be done on the land and how deliberations proceed offers
many opportunities. A predominantly adversarial approach will
undermine the relationships needed to uncover any opportunities
that might be present. Since significant developments frequently
require discretionary approvals, governments can create value or
expand the pie by granting new rights. For example, in the
Rezoning from Single Family to Townhouses case study, the
government rezoned the parcel to change the allowed use from
single family to attached housing and a golf course. A fixed
resource perspective, relying on a competitive process and
undermining relationships, would have inhibited the exploration
of opportunities.

76. These assumptions appear on what has been called “the lawyer’s
standard philosophical map.” Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO
ST. L.J. 29, 43-44 (1982); see also Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer:
On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students,
Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 n. 54 (2002)
(recognizing that the map is overdrawn and does not represent the mindset of
most transactional lawyers, but that it does describe “the way most lawyers
think, most of the time” citing Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra at 46).
77. For example, when negotiating to buy a house the seller wants the
highest price possible and the buyer wants the lowest. What they are
negotiating over is a fixed resource—the seller only has one house and the buyer
only has so much money. The higher the price, the less money the buyer has left
over.
78. FISHER & URY, supra note 70, at 151-53 (pointing out that there are few
situations that are truly zero sum/fix pie; for example, maybe the seller needs to
sell quickly, or the buyer is having a hard time getting a mortgage—there are
creative solutions that could help the parties allocate resources and meet
interests).
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Collaborative approaches can more effectively help clients
meet the full range of needs 79 and explore possibilities for mutual
gain. 80 The community may need senior housing, childcare
facilities, infrastructure repairs, playing fields, or open space.
These are important interests that are often not protected or
advanced by the existing land use regulations.
Having
cooperation as an essential element allows the parties to move
beyond the win-lose dynamic and explore interests beyond just
what is legal.
A collaborative process can also help overcome significant
psychological barriers to creating value and reaching
agreement. 81 Through the competitive dynamic of an adversarial
process parties look unfavorably on solutions proposed by the
other side simply because they are proposed by the other side. 82
In processes like the required process, that set parties against
each other, this reactive devaluation prevents parties from
looking at the situation creatively. 83 Instead of seeing the value
79. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem
Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT L. REV. 97, 109
(2001) (including psychological, economic, social, political, and moral needs).
80. These solutions can be referred to as “win-win,” however, this framing
inappropriately elevates expectations so parties think they will get everything
they want instead of satisfying their interests.
81. CONSENSUS B UILDING I NSTITUTE, COGNITIVE BARRIERS IN THE LAND USE
PLANNING PROCESS 4 (2007), http://cbuilding.org/resource/cognitive-barriersland-use-planning-process (click to download pdf).
82. Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 247 (1993); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 54 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995);
DEUTSCH, supra note 56, at 30 (indicating that “[a] competitive process leads to a
suspicious, hostile attitude, and it increases the readiness to exploit the other’s
needs and respond negatively to the other’s requests.”).
83. Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 38 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
[Reactive devaluation increases] the likelihood that compromise
proposals or concessions designed to demonstrate goodwill and prompt
reciprocation will fail in their objectives. All too often, they will be
dismissed as trivial and token, or received with coolness and expressions
of distrust that serve to thwart the goal of negotiated agreement and to
weaken rather than strengthen the hand of those who urge conciliation.
Id. See also CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 21-22 (“[W]hen parties
choose to enter the legal system, it becomes more difficult for them to exchange
information and adjust their positions. As a result, satisfactory solutions may be
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of the proposal, the parties are blinded by biases and
stereotypes. 84 Attorneys can reduce the effect of this devaluation
by guiding clients to a process where creative ideas are not
presented in the adversarial context. 85 Concept committees are
just one example of a process that reduces the effects of reactive
devaluation.
In significant development decisions, where multiple parties
are involved and multiple issues are being discussed, lawyers
should help parties move from an exclusively adversarial
approach to a process with collaborative elements. Adversarial
approaches start with solutions and emphasize competition
among the parties over how to distribute the available
Collaborative approaches start with gathering
resources. 86
information and emphasize communication that explores possible
solutions. 87 An effective collaborative process also recognizes and
plans for the distribution of resources after value is created. 88
This means that there will be some competitive interactions in a
collaborative process, but those moments are managed so as to
not interfere with the creation of value. 89 The attorney who does
not counsel a client to explore collaborative options loses the
opportunity to create value and will have less to distribute.
overlooked, and resources that could otherwise be developed to finding creative
solutions are poured into carrying on a fight.”).
84. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 21-22.
85. MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 63, at 95-96 (stating that
lawyers should use problem-solving methods in both disputes and deals to
create value that would otherwise be unavailable to the client); CHRISTOPHER W.
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING
CONFLICT 272 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing how “[p]arties often adhere to positions
because they see no other way to develop new ones. Introducing a logical or
acceptable problem-solving process can often allow a disputant to abandon a
position in favor of another option.”).
86. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 756-57 (1984) (discussing
how “in the adversarial approach to negotiation] resources are limited and must
be divided. Information about one’s real preferences must be jealously
guarded.”).
87. See infra Part III.D.
88. MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 63, at 40 (“No matter how
good you are at brainstorming and no matter how carefully you search out
value-creation trades, at some point the pie has to be sliced.”).
89. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING
DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 9
(1988).
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D. Collaboration Has Required Elements
What does “collaboration” mean to the average lawyer? For
some, it may suggest a cooperative process where all the parties
set aside their differences and reach an agreement that
maximizes the common good. Other lawyers may see a group of
people giving away value that they are entitled to, being taken
advantage of, and subverting the safeguards in the required
process. 90 Whichever image a lawyer subscribes to, the reality is
that few have an accurate understanding of what collaboration is.
The popular view that collaborative processes are nebulous
and loosely organized, squarely conflicts with what is practiced by
professionals 91 and promoted by scholars. 92 Over the last forty
years, a range of collaborative techniques has successfully been
applied to public policy disputes dealing with environmental and
land use matters. 93 Through this scholarship and body of
practice, a firm concept of collaboration has emerged that is well
organized, detailed, and specific.
In the public policy context much has been written on
collaboration. 94 Much of this work starts with the understanding
90. GRAY, supra note 3, at 250-51.
91. Including a variety of professional associations ranging from the
International Association of Public Participation, National Coalition for Dialog
and Deliberation, to the Association for Conflict Resolution and American Bar
Association’s Dispute Resolution Section.
92. See CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40; GRAY, supra note 3; Lon
Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971);
FISHER & URY, supra note 70; HOWARD RAIFFA, JOHN RICHARDSON & DAVID
METCALFE, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE
DECISION MAKING 311-27 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadows, The Lawyer’s Role(s)
in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2005); Lawrence Susskind,
Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1
(1981); John P. McCrory, Environmental Mediation—Another Piece for the
Puzzle, 6 VT. L. REV. 49 (1981); Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of
Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981).
93. See GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF
EXPERIENCE (1986); WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 3; LAWRENCE SUSSKIND,
SARAH MCKEARNAN & JENNIFER THOMAS-LARMER, CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (1999); GRAY,
supra note 3; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40; John Forester & David
Stitzel, Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of Activist Mediation in Public
Sector Conflicts, NEGOT. J., July 1989, at 251; MANAGING LAND-USE CONFLICTS:
CASE STUDIES IN SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT (David J. Brower & Daniel S. Carol
eds., 1987).
94. See supra note 92.
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that collaboration is defined as being both assertive and
cooperative. 95 Kenneth Thomas and Ralph Kilmann assert that:
Collaborating involves an attempt to work with others to
find some solution that fully satisfies their concerns. It
means digging into an issue to pinpoint the underlying
needs and wants of the two individuals. Collaborating
between two persons might take the form of exploring a
disagreement to learn from each other’s insights or trying
to find a creative solution to an interpersonal problem. 96
Barbara Gray, in Collaborating, applies this notion to public
policy situations and provides the following commentary:
Five features [of collaboration] are critical to the process: (1)
the stakeholders are interdependent, (2) solutions emerge by
dealing constructively with differences, (3) joint ownership of
decisions is involved, (4) stakeholders assume collective
responsibility for the future direction of the domain and (5)
collaboration is an emergent property. 97
To help organize this advice into an accessible framework for
lawyers in significant development decisions, a collaborative
process must be inclusive, transparent and responsive. Without
these elements, a process labeled “collaborative” will not deliver
on its potential. While other frameworks are available to describe
the elements of a collaborative process in the public policy
context, 98 inclusive, transparent and responsive presents an
95. See Ralph Kilmann, http://www.kilmann.com/conflict.html (last visited
Dec. 15, 2009).
96. Id.
97. GRAY, supra note 3, at 11.
98. For a detailed and comprehensive overview of consensus building see
SUSSKIND, MCKEARNAN & THOMAS-LARMER, supra note 93; see also CARPENTER &
KENNEDY, supra note 40; JIM ARTHUR, CHRIS CARLSON & LEE MOORE, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONSENSUS (1999); Ass’n for Conflict Resolution, Best
Practices for Government Agencies: Guidelines for Using Collaborative
Agreement Seeking Processes, http://www.acrnet.org/acrlibrary/more.php?id=
13_0_1_0_M (last visited Dec. 19, 2009); STEVEN DANIELS & GREGG WALKER,
WORKING THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT: THE COLLABORATIVE LEARNING
APPROACH (2001); GRAY, supra note 3. For a thorough description of meditative
processes that require collaboration, see MOORE, supra note 85; WONDOLLECK, &
YAFFEE, supra note 3; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING (Thomas
Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2008); SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S
RULES, supra note 3.
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accessible model for lawyers involved in development decisions.
Attorneys using these three elements can quickly assess whether
a particular process is on track or needs to be adjusted to better
meet client needs.
* * *
A Note on the Process Manager
One way to ensure that these three elements are present is to
designate a process manager who has the requisite skill and
access to adequate resources. In most public policy situations,
this function is often ignored. Ideally, the process manager
should be a neutral party—one without a stake in the outcome.
At the local level, however, where suspicion runs high and
resources are limited, most groups decide not to hire a neutral. 99
If a group decides to collaborate without hiring a neutral process
manager they must designate one or more parties to serve as the
process manager. Ideally, the designated party will have some
experience in group dynamics and collaboration. 100 The party
should work with the other parties to break out of the adversarial
dynamic, avoid typical traps that waste time and money, so the
party can all create value and claim as much as possible.
The concept committee cases in Part II illustrate how an
interested party can assume the role of process manager. In
some of those cases, the participants felt that the process
manager should have been a neutral. 101 In others, parties were
content with a stakeholder managing the process. 102 Regardless
of the perception, the use of an interested party as a process
99. This is assuming that they are even aware of what a neutral could do to
assist and improve outcomes.
100. In Breaking Robert’s Rules, the parties have the benefit of a community
member, Connie, who has had some experience with facilitation and group
processes. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 3, at
44. Susskind lays out an excellent and comprehensive structure for a
collaborative process, called the Consensus Building Approach that relies
heavily on the guidance and encouragement from Connie. Id. This is an ideal
situation—someone from the community who has the experience and
background to guide the process and also has the free time to serve the group.
Id.
101. See supra Part II.D.
102. See supra Part II.A, II.C and II.D.
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manager presents a potential for abuse that must be guarded
against. Since collaboration is, at its core, an ad hoc process, the
ever-present temptation to tip the scales in one’s favor can
corrupt the intentions of an “interested” process manager. While
experience is useful and a neutral is preferred, the fact remains
that despite decades of support for these ideas, 103 use of neutral
mediators at a local level is the exception rather than the rule.
Lawyers and parties educated and practiced in principles of
collaborative process can help protect against abuses and
advocate for good process in the absence of a skilled neutral.
While there is a persistent debate about the neutrality of the
process manager, 104 there is little debate about the importance of
having a process manager. In all the case studies in Part II, the
parties valued the role of the process manager and recognized the
utility to have someone play that role. For attorneys advising
clients in local land use matters, advocating for a process
manager—ideally as neutral as possible—is a necessity. If hiring
a neutral is not feasible and an interested party manages the
process, then attorney and client must guard vigilantly against
abuses of process.
* * *
1.

Inclusive

To be inclusive, a process must include the right people at the
right time and also include the right ideas.
A principal
frustration with the required process is that the public is not
required to participate until the public hearing, which is often at
the end of the process. 105 By this point, much of the work has
been done by the applicant and the municipality to shape and

103. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, MIEKE VAN DER WANSEM & ARMAND CICCARELLI,
MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS (2000); THE WILLIAM & FLORA
HEWLETT FOUND., ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL GRANTMAKERS (Rosemary O’Leary, Terry Amsler & Malka
Kopell eds., 2005).
104. Forester & Stitzel, supra note 93 (looking at the role of activist mediators
in public sector conflicts).
105. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE, supra note 4.
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condition the proposal. 106 As a result, public involvement is often
characterized by hostile participation and rarely produces much
value. 107 While this hostility is directed at the substance of the
application, much of the frustration is also with the process
itself. 108 In some communities months may pass before the
public is officially asked to comment on an application. 109 A
collaborative process can minimize this frustration by including
the right people early and including the right issues.
In addition to finding and selecting the appropriate
participants, an inclusive process will emphasize building
In order to reach an
relationships among the parties. 110
agreement, parties must communicate with each other. In order
to communicate, parties must have a relationship. 111 Many
process managers have helped parties break through protracted
stalemates by creating opportunities for new relationships to
form. 112 In the successful Northern Ireland peace negotiations,
the mediator created space for the parties to see each other in a
106. MIKE E. MILES ET AL., REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
PROCESS 7 (4th ed. 2007) (presenting a model with “construction” as stage six,
“obtaining government approval” is close to the end, at stage four).
107. HERBERT INHABER, SLAYING THE NIMBY DRAGON 90 (1988).
[R]esidents of Heard County took up arms to keep hazardous waste out
of their community . . . a public hearing where a gun-toting crowd
crammed into the local high school auditorium to parry and jeer at . . .
officials of the state . . . steel drums marked with skull and crossbones
hurled from passing trucks; a rally and cross-burning by the Ku Klux
Klan; a family grocery store selling “Dump the Dump” T-shirts; and most
of all the violence—firebombing, arson, bullet-riddled pickup trucks.
Id.; see also Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of
Environmental Decisions: Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through
Partnerships with Experts and Agents, 27 PACE ENVT. L. REV. 151, 207 (2009).
108. PORTER, supra note 57, at 3 (discussing how “[c]ommunity residents are
given their only opportunity to speak about the issues at the scheduled public
hearings, which can amount to a lame exercise in participatory democracy, the
requisite public involvement that many citizens have come to view as a
charade.”).
109. See Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System, supra
note 9, at 602.
110. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 57-58; E. FRANKLIN DUKES,
MARINA A. PISCOLISH & JOHN B. STEPHENS, REACHING FOR HIGHER GROUND IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TOOLS FOR POWERFUL GROUPS AND COMMUNITIES (2000).
111. Id.
112. MAKING SENSE OF INTRACTABLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: CONCEPTS
AND CASES (Roy J. Lewicki, Barbara Gray & Michael Elliot eds., 2003).
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different light by talking about their families and other interests
like opera. 113 From those relationships, the parties were able to
communicate in a more reliable and productive way to establish
trust, and were eventually able to reach an agreement ending
years of bloody conflict. Local land use disputes, with parties
from the same community, who have overlapping interests and
activities, present rich opportunities to similarly build
relationships and create value. In all of the case studies in Part
II, interviews revealed that the process improved relationships
among the participants.
The commitment to be inclusive must start early. 114 A
process is not inclusive if it begins with the developer or
municipality presenting a well-polished proposal that was created
after months of internal preparation. To be inclusive, parties
must be involved long before an application is submitted or even
ready to be submitted. 115 Starting early allows for the greatest
flexibility in reaching an agreement. 116 Early in the process
parties have not committed to and invested in particular
solutions; their positions have not hardened thus creating a
greater range of opportunities to meet parties’ interests. 117 There
are however, significant barriers to starting the process early.
Parties often have inflated views of likely outcomes. 118 A
developer may view her application as likely to be approved while
opponents may earnestly hold the opposite view. In addition, a
local official may look at the situation as it evolves and feel
confident that he can manage any conflict that might result in a
113. GEORGE MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (1999).
114. “Early” usually means before an application has been submitted so that
resources are not committed to a particular proposal that can limit flexibility
later on. Some scholars refer to this as “upstream.” See THE WILLIAM & FLORA
HEWLETT FOUND., supra note 103; THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham
eds., 2003); Lisa B. Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and
the Incomplete Legal Framework for Citizen and Stakeholder Voice, 1 HASTINGS
ANN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
115. Sean Nolon, Moving Collaboration Upstream, ACRESOLUTION, Summer
2007, at 26.
116. Id.
117. McAdoo & Bakken, supra note 6; Edith Netter, Using Mediation to
Resolve Land Use Disputes, 15 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP . 25 (1992); Edith Netter,
Using Mediation to Supplement Zoning Hearings, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.
(1992).
118. CONSENSUS BUILDING INSTITUTE, supra note 81.
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manner that will satisfy all who are involved. Research and
findings in neuroscience, cognitive psychology and related fields
have given us a greater understanding of these barriers. 119 In
many cases, this overconfidence is reinforced by comments from
attorneys who, in assessing likely outcomes, tend to emphasize
the positive and omit the negative aspects of a case.
A less significant, but still important obstacle is the need for
information gathering. Under the structure of the required
process, a developer will create a proposal based on his
assessment of the relevant laws and the constraints of the
property. 120 A tremendous amount of money will be spent to pay
for lawyers, planners, engineers, and scientists to help create that
proposal. 121 Under the structure of a collaborative process, the
developer can show the parties a basic, inexpensive development
plan allowed under the existing law and then ask them if that is
what they want to see. If not, the developer can dedicate the
funds he would have spent on a full proposal, to engage in joint
fact finding and gather information about development
opportunities and environmental constraints. 122 This is similar
to what the developer did in the Rezoning from Single Family to
Townhouses case study. 123
Finally, the process must be framed broadly. While including
the right people is the hallmark of any collaborative process, the

119. While it is impracticable to generalize across the great variety of
development disputes, this research gives us a small window into the
motivations of some parties: the endowment effect, the status quo bias,
overconfidence, self serving bias. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch &
Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Test of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Russell B. Korobkin, Inertia and
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules
and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998) (discussing status quo bias);
George Lowenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self
Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135
(1993) (discussing self-serving bias).
120. See MILES ET. AL, supra note 106, at 481-83.
121. Id.
122. PETER ADLER ET AL., MANAGING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR MEDIATORS AND
FACILITATORS (2000), http://www.resolv.org/publications/reports/Environmental_
Cases.pdf; Norman Shultz, Joint Fact Finding, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY.ORG,
July 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/joint_fact-finding/.
123. See supra Part II.B.
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approach must also be inclusive of ideas. 124 By framing the
initiative broadly, a process can include the full range of topics
that are important to the parties. Critics of collaboration argue
that a broad scope makes reaching agreement harder. 125 The
more issues there are on the table—the more out of control the
process will become, the more expensive it will be and the less
focused the negotiation will be. 126 This criticism ignores the
reality that most significant development proposals going
through the required process have to address an oppressive
number of issues in their formal review regardless of whether
they are significant issues. 127 As a result, the issues are only
dealt with in a perfunctory manner, to meet the procedural
requirements, but not to address the issues. 128 A collaborative
process identifies the truly relevant issues that actually need to
be addressed and creates a productive structure to mitigate their
impact. As a result, the collaborative process can create more
opportunity for creative problem solving.
2.

Transparent

A transparent process allows people to peer in and see what
is happening, what has happened, and what will be happening.
Transparency requires information to be published widely and
124. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 54-55 (making the point that
the problems identified initially are often not the real problems at issue
requiring openness to new information).
125. See E. FRANKLIN D UKES & KAREN FIREHOCK, U NIV. OF VA.’S I NST . FOR
ENVTL . NEGOTIATION, C OLLABORATION: A GUIDE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVOCATES 69 (Michael Leahy & Mike Anderson, eds., 2001); Douglas S.
Kenney, Are Community-Based Watershed Groups Really Effective?, 3 CHRON.
CMTY. 33 (1999); DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, NATURAL RES . LAW CTR., UNIV. OF
COLO. SCH. OF LAW, ARGUING ABOUT CONSENSUS : EXAMINING THE CASE
AGAINST W ESTERN W ATERSHED I NITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE
GROUPS IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000), http://www.cde.state.co.
us/artemis/ucb6/UCB6582C762000INTERNET.pdf; George Cameron Coggins,
Of Californicators, Quislings, and Crazies: Some Perils of Devolved
Collaboration, 2 CHRON. CMTY. 27 (1988); Michael McCloskey, The Skeptic:
Collaboration Has Its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 13, 1996.
126. Id.
127. Struever Fidelco Cappelli, A Bold New Future for Yonkers,
http://www.sfcyonkers.com/feis/index.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2009).
128. Michael Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information Technology to
Improve the Environmental Impact Review Process, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 18,
22-23 (2003).
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through many channels, so that as many people as possible know
about it. Transparency addresses another major frustration with
the required process—that it does not adequately inform
interested citizens what is happening in the decision-making
process.
The minimum notice requirements are mandatory statutory
obligations. 129 For example, in New York, the public hearing for
a site plan application must be held within sixty-two days of
receiving the application. 130 Depending on the jurisdiction, notice
might be a certified letter to adjacent property owners, it might
be to all property owners within 500 feet, or it might require
posting of the notice on the subject property. 131 Once the
application is accepted, the board will need to notice all public
hearings and workshops and include the matter on the
agendas. 132 While notice provisions may meet basic due process
rights, they do little to satisfy interested parties who would like
to be involved. In many situations, notice is so vague that
recipients may wonder what a board will be discussing.
Typically, there is little information on the agenda to indicate the
sequence of events at a meeting. Items may be placed on the
agenda in the order in which they were requested rather than in
terms of priority. 133 Many people may be in attendance who will
have to wait through ministerial matters until late in the evening
for the matter with which they are concerned to be heard. 134 This
breeds frustration and anger, and gives the impression that the
board is not interested in input from the community.
Collaborative processes aspire to a level of satisfaction
beyond what is required by due process. 135 Because collaborative
processes are used to satisfy requirements beyond due process,
129. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(8) (McKinney 2009).
130. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (8) (McKinney 2009).
131. See, e.g., CODE OF THE CITY OF YONKERS , N.Y., ch. 43, art. IX, §§ 43-99.
132. See, e.g., The Open Meetings Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF . LAW, art. 7, § 104
(McKinney 2009).
133. Interview with Dr. Michael Klemens, Rye, N.Y. (Sept. 2000). There are
certainly exceptions to this practice. Boards will adjust their agenda to move
priority items earlier in the evening if a large contingent of citizens is in
attendance. Of course, there are plenty of boards that schedule controversial
matters for later in the night, as well.
134. Id.
135. For a description of what due process requires, see JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985).
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they should be constructed as if they are on display, available for
viewing by both the casual observers and involved parties. Again,
the ultimate goal in transparency is to allow anyone who is
interested (participant or not) to be able to look into the process
and see what has happened, what is happening, and where the
Posting meeting notes, agendas, and
process is going. 136
schedules on websites can accomplish this effectively; however,
depending on the community and the situation, a more engaged
method of outreach may be necessary. 137
The concept of transparency may make some attorneys
uncomfortable because of a perceived strategic disadvantage for
some clients. Providing the wrong information at the wrong time
may prejudice the outcome. Being transparent, however, does not
mean that all the information is discoverable; that would be both
impractical and unwise. Transparency refers to information
about the process—when meetings will be held, what will be
discussed, who will be there—as well as information shared in
the process. While this might be obvious to some, there is a
danger that parties misunderstand what happens in a
collaborative process. While a collaborative process has elements
of cooperation, it also has assertive elements. 138 Assertiveness
compels parties to be truthful and honest about the power they
posses, the rights they have and what interests they want to see
met. 139 Being assertive also requires a party to be strategic about
what information they give out and when. Therefore, being
transparent refers to what is happening in meetings and at the
“table,” but does not extend to the information parties decide not
to share.
3.

Responsive

Meeting this third element is the most challenging. The
essence of responsiveness is that the parties are ultimately in
control of the process and the outcome. Practically, being
136. David Strauss, Designing a Consensus Building Process Using a Graphic
Road Map, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REACHING AGREEMENT 137 (Larry Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (providing an
excellent example of process mapping).
137. Id.
138. See Ralph Kilmann, supra note 95.
139. Id.
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responsive means that the process adjusts to new information
and anticipates the next steps. Meeting this element requires
constant attention from a skilled and patient process manager.
One of the flaws of the required process is that it is
inflexible. 140 It requires a large amount of information to be
collected and organized during the very early stages. 141 In
significant development decisions, preparing an application can
be very expensive. 142 Applicants spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars gathering information, hiring experts, reviewing the
applicable law, and drafting maps for the application prior to
submission. 143 Making this investment places significant inertia
behind the application, making a developer reluctant to consider
alterations. An early collaborative process, such as a concept
committee, helps applicants consider valuable alternatives before
large amounts of money are spent and parties commit to their
positions.
Lawyers favor the required process because they perceive it
as predictable. Specifically enforceable time frames give this
impression; however, when dealing with significant decisions, the
promise of predictability is an illusion. Collaboration, on the
other hand, is perceived as unpredictable because the governing
guidelines are not codified or standardized ahead of time. Many
lawyers may be hesitant to trade the perceived predictability of
the required process for what looks like an ad hoc approach. The
responsive nature of collaboration feeds this fear. How can a
process be predictable if it changes in response to new
information? How do we know what to expect?
While the required process may be predictable with as-ofright and ministerial decisions, the approval process for
significant
development
decisions
can
be
predictably
unpredictable. Boards can delay their decision-making process if
matters become too complicated or controversial. Laws can be

140. See Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1966); City of
Searcy v. Roberson, 273 S.W.2d 26 (Ark. 1954); but see In re Merson v. McNally,
688 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1997).
141. See MILES ET AL., supra note 106.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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changed or subject to different interpretations. 144 Appeals can
add delay and inject doubt. 145 Board members can be removed or
step down and new ones can be appointed or elected. 146 In short,
when significant developments are subjected to the required
process, predictability is not guaranteed. 147 Recognizing the fact
that these situations are inherently complicated and ill suited for
the required process, a properly designed collaborative process
may actually present a more predictable option.
Most process managers will address predictability as the first
order of business. 148 They engage parties to establish procedures
that will address a variety of circumstances. How will we
incorporate new information? What responsibility do parties
have? How will we conduct our deliberations? How do we
integrate new parties into the process? The best way to manage
the uncertainty surrounding these questions and others is to
create ground rules. 149 There are many good examples of useful
ground rules and what is appropriate depends on the situation. 150
By establishing and following these ground rules, the participants
will construct a process of their own making. The predictability

144. Laws on vested rights, while varying from state to state, explain when an
applicant’s rights to a particular approval become immutable or “vested.” In
some states, an approval is not vested until the applicant has made significant
investment and considerable construction. See MANDELKER, supra note 15, §
6.12.
145. All local decisions can be appealed administratively or through the state
court system. These appeals are costly and time consuming for all involved. By
filing an appeal, an opponent can stall a project for years. See MANDELKER,
supra note 15, §§ 8.12-.23.
146. Depending on the state and the type of board, members may be appointed
or elected.
147. See BABCOCK, supra note 4.
148. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 118.
149. Id.
150. Interview with Mary Davis Hamlin, White Plains, New York, (Oct.
1999). Most ground rules call for respectful behavior to encourage productive
deliberation. In some situations, ground rules such as “disagree without being
disagreeable” will suffice. In other situations, where the environment is more
hostile, more directive ground rules are required. For example, in a negotiation
between animal rights advocates and trappers, one of the ground rules was
“leave your guns at the door.”
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achieved through this approach can be more durable and
satisfying than what is offered by the required process. 151
One of the most important ground rules is how decisions are
made. 152 Being an ad hoc process, the participants must agree on
how they are to agree. Since the required process uses majority
and supermajority voting, that is what most parties will be
accustom to. Consensus and unanimity are more common in
collaborative processes. 153 Accordingly, parties usually employ
some form of consensus as the grounds for reaching a decision. 154
The creation and use of these ground rules makes the process
more predictable and satisfying than the rigid required process.
By advocating for an inclusive, transparent and responsive
process, attorneys will be more likely to satisfy clients and
themselves. A process manager will have many strategies and
techniques to meet these elements. 155 Attorneys recommending
that clients participate in a collaborative process should review a
proposed design before committing. If the three elements are not
present, the client and attorney should contact the process
manager to discuss deficiencies and design remedies. Since
process design in this arena is generally flexible, attorneys can
expect to influence the design.
By contacting the process
manager and raising concerns about perceived procedural
deficiencies, the manager will have an opportunity to be
responsive and either explain the design or make adjustments to
build a better process.
E.

A Consensus Agreement Does Not Substitute for
the Board’s Decision

Many attorneys counsel clients against participating in a
collaborative process arguing that it improperly delegates the
151. SUSSKIND, VAN DER WANSEM & CICCARELLI, supra note 103, at 17
(reporting on a survey of 100 land use mediations where 84% of participants
were satisfied with the process).
152. MOORE, supra note 85, at 430-31.
153. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 29.
154. Id.
155. SUSSKIND, MCKEARNAN & LARMER-THOMAS, supra note 93; GRAY, supra
note 3; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40; THEODORE W. KHEEL, THE KEYS
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PROVEN METHODS OF SETTLING DISPUTES VOLUNTARILY
(1999).
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municipality’s authority to make decisions. 156 The argument
mischaracterizes the purpose of a collaborative process and
misses a crucial step. It assumes that the collaborative process is
a substitute for the official decision-making process. If this were
the case, discouraging advice would be fitting. However, in the
consensus committees described above and according to best
practices, the agreements reached are not substitutes for the
required process. 157 Instead, the agreement reached in the
committee becomes part of the application submitted to the
government and is then subject to a full review by the decisionmaking body. 158 As part of this review, the government still has
its statutory authority to approve the application, impose
conditions or deny. Lawyers should be aware that, when
following proper procedure, the consensus committee’s agreement
supplements, not substitutes, the required process.
Another misperception is that participation in the process
ends when the agreement is reached. Attorneys may counsel
clients to avoid a consensus process because they fear it will limit
their ability to participate during the required process. This
advice ignores the fact that an agreement of the committee does
not amount to an official decision. After the committee reaches
agreement, the landowner uses the agreement to craft an
application. 159 Once it is submitted, the committee members can
participate in the required process as members of the public,
through public hearings, commenting on the deliberations.
Participation in one process does not bar participation in the
other. In the second case study, the developer made a major
change to the application by switching the golf course from public
The
to private after the agreement had been reached. 160
committee members were furious with the change and made their
opinions known to the government. In response, the developer
156. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356
(1997).
157. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 3, at 14345.
158. Id.
159. Lawrence Susskind, Patrick Field & Alexis Gensberg, Building
Consensus: Dealing with Controversial Land Use Issues & Disputes, 48 PLAN.
COMM’R. J. 16, 19 (2002).
160. See supra Part II.B, para. 6.
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explained the reason for the change and made accommodations to
address their concerns. 161
F.

Agreements Must Be Monitored

If an agreement is reached through a collaborative process, it
must be converted into a proposal, submitted to the government
and then, if approved, the project must be built. Attorneys can
help their clients by monitoring the required process and
informing clients of important developments and relevant time
frames. Many parties assume that agreements reached in
negotiation will not change and be approved, unaltered, by the
government. This is not always true in practice. As a proposal
passes through the required decision-making process new
information comes to light and alterations to the proposal may be
required. 162 So long as the parties involved consider them minor
and agree with the rationale, these alterations may be
appropriate. In addition, non-lawyers may not be aware of what
impact one decision in the required process will have on another.
Lawyers can add value by monitoring any changes in the proposal
and communicating the significance of those changes to the
members of the committee.
Assuming that the board approves a proposal that resembles
the concept committee’s agreement, the next challenge is
ensuring the project is built as approved. Again, lawyers are
perfectly situated to certify that construction is progressing
consistent with the committee’s intent. If construction deviates
from the permitted approval, the attorney can quickly inform the
participants and the error can be cured in a timely manner. 163
By having attorneys monitor the implementation, parties can
confidently return to their lives without fear that their hard work
will be ignored.
CONCLUSION
The author does not argue that collaborative approaches such
as concept committees should replace the required decision161. Id.
162. MILES ET AL., supra note 106, at 487-503.
163. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 3, at 187.
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making process and that they are appropriate in all situations.
Rather, the author argues for a supplemental collaborative
process to be used in significant development decisions where the
government has considerable discretion when reviewing an
application, when some form of development is likely to occur,
and when any governmental decision is likely to be challenged.
The four cases in Part II offer evidence of how this can be done
and Part III presents a framework to guide lawyers. By
supplementing the required process to deal with significant
developments, lawyers can help communities improve their
chances of attracting and approving the most appropriate projects
while building civic capacity at a time when we desperately
needed it. While these processes may require more time and
thought early on, the benefits achieved in the long term make the
effort worthwhile.
A review of these case studies reveals common elements that
contributed to the success of the process. First, someone was
responsible for managing the process. Second, the process was
inclusive, transparent and responsive.
Third, information
sharing and flexibility were encouraged. Fourth, the collaboration began early in the process. Fifth, the process was supported
and favored by the key parties including the decision-making
boards. The parties stated that a collaborative approach is more
likely to produce a better project, help the parties share reliable
and relevant information, use time more efficiently, conserve
resources by pooling the efforts of many, reduce the need for
multiple experts, and build relationships.
Based on their
accounts and the results, we can see that interested process
managers can help add collaborative elements to otherwise
adversarial situations.
Well-informed lawyers can play an
influential role advocating for sound collaborative approaches and
making up for the lack of a neutral process manager.
Attorneys who do not understand that these are
supplemental processes will continue to discourage their use and
miss opportunities to help their clients. This is not to say that
the required process should always be supplemented—as there
are advantages to the required process. 164 Those advantages,
however, should be weighed against the disadvantages so clients
164. See supra Part III.A.
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can make an informed decision regarding process. When clients
are confronted with situations that are not appropriate for a strict
adversarial environment, they need sound process advice from
their counsel. Without such advice, client’s needs go unmet and
opportunities will be lost.
Seizing the opportunities presented by significant
development decisions is of critical importance locally to our
communities and collectively to our nation. Lawyers must
actively promote and advance a new relationship with significant
development decisions that not only protects against perils but
also recognizes and takes advantage of inherent opportunities.
Hopefully, this new relationship will set us on a course where
more satisfying outcomes become the rule rather than the
exception.
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